



The Wrath of Paris: Ethical Vocabulary and Ethical Type in the Iliad

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THE WRATH OF PARIS:
ETHICAL VOCABULARY AND ETHICAL TYPE IN THE *ILIAD*

I

Having found Paris in the chamber where Aphrodite hid him after his duel with Menelaus, Hector rebukes him for withdrawing from battle when so many of his people are dying on his account:

τὸν δ' Ἔκτωρ νείκεσεν ἰδὼν αἰσχροῖς ἐπέεσσιν·
“δαιμόνι, οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδ' ἐνθεο θυμῷ.
λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι περὶ πτόλιν αἰπύ τε τεῖχος
μαρνάμενοι· σέο δ' εἵνεκ' αὐτὴ τε πτόλεμός τε
ἄστυ τόδ' ἀμφιδέδηε· σὺ δ' ἂν μαχέσαιο καὶ ἄλλω,
ὃν τινά που μεθιέντα ἴδοις στυγεροῦ πολέμοιο.
ἄλλ' ἄνα, μὴ τάχα ἄστυ πυρὸς δηΐοιο θέρηται.”

6.325-31

Hector's attribution of *kholos*, or “wrath,” to Paris as the reason for his withdrawal has occasioned much controversy. There seem to be no obvious grounds for Hector to assume such a thing; and we know that Paris has been occupied with Helen rather than a wrath.

Paris' response suggests that the brothers both understand the frame of reference for Hector's allegation to be Paris' recent loss to Menelaus (*nikê d' epameibetai andras*: 339), but otherwise Paris' words seem to pose more questions than they answer:

τὸν δ' αὐτε προσέειπεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής·
“Ἔκτορ, ἐπεὶ με κατ' αἶσαν ἐνείκεσας οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αἶσαν,
τοῦνεκά τοι ἐρέω· σὺ δὲ σύνθεο καὶ μευ ἄκουσον.
οὐ τοι ἐγὼ Τρώων τόσσον χόλῳ οὐδὲ νεμέσσι
ἦμην ἐν θαλάμῳ, ἔθελον δ' ἄχρ' προτραπέσθαι.
νῦν δέ με παρειποῦς ἄλοχος μαλακοῖς ἐπέεσσιν
ῶρμησ' ἐς πόλεμον, δοκέει δέ μοι ὥδε καὶ αὐτῷ
λῶϊον ἔσσεσθαι· νίκη δ' ἐπαμείβεται ἄνδρας.”

6.332-39

That Hector's remark is meant as a *neikos* (325) might allow us to understand it as sarcastic, but Paris seems to take it seriously. Although he does not take issue with Hector's right to rebuke him (333), he does take some pains to correct him. Paris denies that he is lingering in his chamber out of any *kholos* against the Trojans, but rather in order to yield

himself up *akhos* 'grief' (336).¹ Yet the point of the distinction which Paris is making is not clear. We have hardly been led to expect grief on his part any more than a wrath. Besides, Paris seems to categorize *kholos* with another term, *nemesis*, and to oppose them both generically to *akhos*; but we have no access to his logic. In short, the brothers' exchange over why Paris is in his chamber rather than on the battlefield seems puzzling and obscure.

Both Schadewaldt and Kakridis attempted to make sense of this *kholos*—which analyst critics had long found unmotivated²—by relating the scene to the embassies sent to appease the wraths of Achilles and Meleager. Both scholars implied that the *kholos* is incorporated into Hector's visit to recall Paris through the influence of what is a typical scene within a typical epic story-pattern—the embassy to the withdrawn and wrathful warrior—in which certain details are traditionally embedded. Indeed, it is characteristic of traditional epic poetry to yield first allegiance to such architectonic patterns, rather than to the unique requirements of the narrative moment.³

The notion that, in Homer, traditional narrative patterns ordain the selection of details, is indeed indispensable to the understanding of this scene. Yet Schadewaldt and Kakridis never move far away from the analyst view that the *kholos* at 6.326 is otiose; they do not develop the

¹I translate *akhos* as "grief" in this paper, or else leave it untranslated, even though grief is not necessarily the meaning suggested by the lexicographers for every passage I discuss (e.g., Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.*, s.v. *akhos*). These lexicographical subcategories of meaning, necessary for translating Homer, are nevertheless not distinguished by the term *akhos* itself as independent connotations within Homeric language or thought: in other words, *akhos* is used both for lamentation (24.773) and regret (3.176). Rather, as I will be arguing, nuances in meaning are suggested by the term's deployment in respect to other terms.

²In fact, this *kholos* was one cause of analyst discomfort with Book 6 generally: see A. Heubeck, *Die Homerische Frage* (Darmstadt 1974) 65–68; and G. Broccia, *La questione omerica* (Firenze 1979) 103–106. For more detailed discussions of the debate see J. T. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949) 43–40 and E. Heitsch, "Der Zorn des Paris," *Festschrift für Joseph Klein zum 70. Geburtstag* (Göttingen 1967) 216–47. Of course, the passage occasioned some comment long before analyst criticism (see Heitsch 222–26).

³W. Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien* (Leipzig 1943) 142–43; Kakridis (note 2 above) 47–49. See also M. M. Willcock, *A Commentary on Homer's Iliad I–VI* (London 1970) 213. However divergent their respective approaches to the Homeric poems, Kakridis and Schadewaldt are united on this question by their agreement on the traditional nature of the poetry. On the pull of the scene-type in introducing narrative awkwardness, see M. Edwards, "Type-Scenes and Homeric Hospitality," *TAPA* 105 (1975) 72 and A. B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (New York 1960) 93–97.

possibility, which they indeed suggest, that Hector's remark expresses a comparison between Paris and an Achilles or Meleager.⁴ Their solution, however, invites a consideration of wrath and grief as ethical concepts in Iliadic diction, and of the way such terms are related to an ethical type, specifically, to the "heroic ethos" exemplified by an Achilles or Meleager.⁵ Such an examination will lay the foundation for our discussion of this scene. In particular it will lead us to suggest that this exchange between Hector and Paris is animated, not only by the story-pattern of the withdrawn and wrathful warrior, but by a character typology which, as though overlying the narrative pattern, also governs the deployment of certain details, in particular, the terms *akhos*, *kholos*, and *nemesis*. Moreover, we shall be able to show how the appearance of these terms in this scene, far from being gratuitous, helps to express Paris' distance from the warrior ethos, and suggests the way he is conceived by this poem whose interest is centered on the warrior Achilles.

II

Comparison with the example of Achilles suggests immediately another problem with our scene besides its apparent lack of motivation. When Achilles' wrath—which is called a *kholos* at its advent and the

⁴Schadewaldt (note 3 above) and, even more, Kakridis (note 2 above) 46 seem to want to see the *kholos* both as an idle motif generated by a narrative pattern and, paradoxically, as playing a meaningful role in this scene by advancing some kind of ethical contrast between Paris and Hector. This paper will attempt to clarify the problem which leads to this confusion: that is, the relationship between narrative pattern and character type. Other critics, even when they have noted the heroic connotations of a withdrawal in *kholos*, have offered what seem to me to be unsatisfactory readings of this scene because they have not rigorously considered this issue. For instance, it cannot simply be assumed that Paris' answer is unproblematic because *akhos* is unheroic and suited to him, as the example of Achilles' *akhos* makes clear (B. L. Hijmans, "Alexandros and His Grief," *Grazer Beitr.* 3 [1975] 180; W. Bergold, *Der Zweikampf des Paris und Menelaos* [Bonn 1977] 176–83; and G. Jachmann, *Homerische Einzellieder* [Darmstadt 1968] 13).

⁵It should be clear that I view Achilles' withdrawal as representing the heroic ideal for behavior under the circumstances which inspire it, i.e., an assault on his honor and a violation of etiquette (e.g., 1.126, 214, 275–76). Perhaps the most succinct evidence for my view is Phoenix' introduction of the Meleager story as a precedent for Achilles (9.523–25); but see D. Claus, "Aidōs in the Language of Achilles," *TAPA* 105 (1975), and J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago 1975) 103–106 for more detailed arguments. Indeed, Achilles' position in respect to the heroic ideal becomes more problematic and paradoxical with his refusal of the Embassy in 9; but this is a matter beyond the scope of this paper.

majority of times thereafter⁶—descends upon him, so does an *akhos* (1.188, 192). In fact, the *akhos* descends first, and seems to cause and even complement the *kholos*. Paris, by contrast, uses the terms as though they are opposed.

The case of Achilles, who suffers wrath and grief together, seems to be merely an enlargement of the regular patterning of the terms generally in the *Iliad*: that is, *akhos* is closely bound up with *kholos*, describing a related reaction to the same kinds of events.⁷ As in the case of Achilles' *akhos* and *kholos* over Agamemnon's treatment of him, *kholos* and *akhos* are regularly inspired by unjust blame, dishonor, or injury directed at oneself or at a *philos*.⁸ Thus, for example, Agamemnon's *akhos* at being blamed for the plague which afflicts the Achaeans leads him to conceive a *kholos* at his blamers, Calchas and then Achilles (1.78, 103, 387). *Akhos* and *kholos* are also aroused by the death or endangerment of a *philos*, or by one's own endangerment; in this context, the *kholos* is usually directed toward an enemy, and usually on the battlefield.⁹ Thus, for example, Achilles' *akhos* over Patroclus inspires his *kholos* at Hector, Patroclus' slayer; and Priam's *akhos* at the sight of his son's corpse threatens to inspire his *kholos* at Achilles (18.320, 322, 337; 24.584).

Kholos and *akhos*, of course, do not necessarily appear together, but each term appears exclusively in the contexts outlined above. Both

⁶*Kholos* seems to be a rough equivalent of *ménis*. Achilles' *ménis*: 1.1, 488; 2.772, etc. His *kholos*: 1.283; 4.513; 9.260, etc. *Kholos* and *ménis* are also paired at 16.61–62, 202–203; 15.122; cf. *h. Dem.* 410. On their denotative distinctions, see P. Considine, "Some Homeric Terms for Anger," *Acta Classica* 9 (1966) 15–25 Schol. *Od.* 2.315 (ed. Dindorf) and G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* [Baltimore 1979] 72ff. In addition, *kholos* seems to be replaced at times by forms of *khôomai* and *kotos* (1.78–82; 1.9, 476; 2.689, 694; 9.534, 538; 16.660, 662, etc.). On synonymy as an artifice to aid composition see J. B. Hainsworth, *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* (Oxford 1968) 82–83, 124, 128.

⁷This relationship of *akhos* to *kholos* is noted by Nagy (note 6 above) 79–80, and by E. M. Voigt in the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, ed. B. Snell, s.v. *akhos*, 1776, 16–27 and 1777, 25–40. Indeed, Paris' wrath is singled out as mystifying (1778, 24–27).

⁸1.78, 80, 81, 103, 247 (*ménis*), 387, etc.; also see 18.111–12; 23.566–67; 15.208, 217; 19.125–27. Cf. 2.171, 195, where the *akhos* and *kholos* are split between two *philois* over an insult to one.

⁹17.710; 18.322, 320, 337; 19.8, 16; 24.584. Cf. 16.581, 585; 23.566–67; 23.23, 37, 47; 13.658, 660; 1.241, 244; 14.39, 50 (which shows a conflation of the two contexts). The gods behave similarly in respect to *kholos* and *akhos*: see, e.g., 20.293–308. Other terms for grief can behave similarly: see, e.g., 16.548, 553; 15.138, 110; 8.460, 464, 478. See also *h. Dem.* 77, 83, 90–91.

terms denote complementary and regular reactions to the same stimulus, which we might summarize as an inimical action perpetrated against oneself or one's *philos*; most commonly, this is physical or verbal assault, on the battlefield or in council. Such an act is the source of grief in its object and/or inspires *kholos* against its perpetrator: where one appears, so would the other be appropriate. There are in fact no other passages in which the terms are explicitly opposed as Paris opposes them.

Paris' claim, that he has an *akhos* but not a *kholos*, appears therefore to be idiosyncratic. However, an examination of the term *nemesis*, which Paris relates to *kholos* in his answer, will shed light on Paris' meaning. First, *nemesis* has a function within the very pattern of usage we have just sketched, denoting a reaction which overlaps and is aligned with *kholos*. The close connection of *nemesis* with *aidôs*—both function as sanctions against unheroic behavior—helps to locate *akhos* and *kholos* within a group of terms which describe heroic etiquette. Second, definition of the broader connotation of *kholos*—its evocation of the heroic ideal—brings into view several passages which yield parallels to Paris' usage of the terms.

Nemesis and its forms denote both righteous indignation and the verbal expression of that indignation, or blame. It is provoked by conduct which does not respect the norms of the warrior dominated community. On the battlefield, it is *nemesis* which along with *aidôs* functions as the sanction against unwarriorlike behavior.¹⁰ The denotative meaning of *nemesis* of course does not duplicate that of *kholos*—it is not appropriate against an enemy who has killed a *philos*—but the semantic fields of the two terms do overlap. For *nemesis*, like *kholos*, denotes a reaction to blame which is felt to be unjust, and to other violations of propriety. Indeed, the terms complement each other elsewhere in Homeric phraseology, just as Paris uses them (8.407 = 421); and *nemesis* appears as a correlate to *kholos*, both inspired by grief (16.544, 553).

¹⁰Much has been written on *nemesis* in Homer. See, e.g., J. C. Riedinger, "Les deux *aidôs* chez Homère," *RPh* 54 (1980) 69–74; J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago 1975) 113–19; H. North, *Sophrosyne* (Ithaca 1966) 6–8; A. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960) 42–46; C. von Erffa, "Aidôs und verwandte begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit," *Phil Supp.* 30 (1937) 35–36. Behavior which endangers one's companions and aids one's enemy is that which arouses *nemesis*, as at 16.544; 17.93, 100, 254; 13.293; etc. *Aidôs* is that sense which anticipates and avoids *nemesis*, as at 24.44, 53.

Paris' pairing of *nemesis* with *kholos* is, then, conventional; his opposition of it to *akhos* appears not to be. However, Helen at one point seems to use *akhos* and *nemesis* as Paris does:

κεῖσε δ' ἐγὼν οὐκ εἶμι, νεμεσσητὸν δέ κεν εἶη,
 κείνου πορσανέουσα λέχος' Τρῳαὶ δέ μ' ὀπίσσω
 πᾶσαι μωμήσονται, ἔχω δ' ἄχε' ἄκριτα θυμῷ.

3.410–12

Helen is here angrily refusing Aphrodite's summons to her to go to Paris, who has just disgraced himself in his duel with Menelaus. Helen recognizes that her association with Paris will provoke the *nemesis* of the Trojan women. Although the prospect of being blamed by the community causes her *akhea*, Helen seems with *nemessêton* to assert the verity of this criticism of herself. Indeed, that this is Helen's attitude is suggested by the words with which she leads up to her refusal (399–409): she denigrates her marriage to Paris, Aphrodite its patroness, even herself (404). Her words inspire a *kholos* in Aphrodite (413), but it is safe to say that when Helen suffers *akhea* from the Trojan blame, *kholos* and *nemesis* on Helen's part will be distinctly inappropriate. Significantly, Helen is fond of saying that she lives her life to constant execration (6.351; 24.767–75; 3.242); that she regrets the acts which inspire this blame (3.173–76; 6.344–48; 24.764); that she as a consequence — of the blame or of the regret which it evokes in her — weeps and grieves (3.176; 24.773–75). The *Iliad's* Helen espouses very conservative values, blaming herself as well as Paris, another ethical aberrant, for his disregard for *nemesis* (6.351), while she extols the warrior (3.428–29, 179–80). Helen's *akhea*, like her self-blame, seem to indicate her ethical posture, expressing her endorsement of the values which condemn her. Her capacity for nursing *akhea* devoid of *kholos* or *nemesis* appears to express her attitude just as does her sensitivity to *nemesis* itself. Such details identify her relation to the poem's values: condemned by them as a transgressor, she embraces them.¹¹

We might infer from the above that Paris' *akhos* is his way of trying to position himself on the side of those orthodox warrior values which drive Hector repeatedly to condemn him (6.325–31; 3.38–57; 13.768–73). In fact, Hector, who is Paris' most frequent critic, will claim to suffer *akhea* himself at the community's continual blame of

¹¹J. Griffin sees Helen's grief and self-condemnation as part of her general self-consciousness (*Homer on Life and Death* [Oxford 1980] 96–98).

Paris (6.524). His grief likewise seems to grow out of his acknowledgement of the basic justice of this criticism (523–25).¹²

Thetis' perpetual grief, like Helen's, seems to reflect her ethical status. Summoned to Olympus on account of Achilles' mistreatment of Hector's corpse, Thetis demurs, claiming to have *aidós* at the thought of mixing with the immortals:

“τίπτε με κείνος ἄνωγε μέγας θεός; αἰδέομαι δὲ
μίσγεσθ' ἀθανάτοισιν, ἔχω δ' ἄχε' ἄκριτα θυμῷ.
εἶμι μὲν, οὐδ' ἄλιον ἔπος ἔσσεται, ὅτι κεν εἴπη.”

24.90–92

Her grief, although certainly appropriate to the death of Patroclus and the imminent mortality of her son, seems specifically in this passage to be connected with her ambiguous status in the divine community, whose *nemesis* at her appearance she anticipates,¹³ and which causes her grief. Elsewhere, Thetis raises the issue of her ambiguous status among the gods (*atimotaté*, 1.514–16); and inasmuch as this status is embodied in her marriage to a mortal, identifies it as the source of her grief (18.429–41).

In a fashion parallel on the divine level to Helen's elicitation of blame for her transgression against the ethical standards of the warrior community, Thetis' appearance on Olympus betokens a violation of the divine community's etiquette, insofar as it is evidently seen as a threat to the other gods' domains of influence and *timé* (1.518–23; 24.111). Thetis' attitude of wrathless grief, like Helen's over her status in the Trojan community, helps to express her marginal and subordinate status in the divine community, as well as her obeisance to its ethical standards. Those who would blame her, besides their higher social status, possess also the weight of moral authority to sanction their positions.

We might compare the Achaean reaction to Odysseus' abuse of Thersites. By way of introduction to Thersites' speech, the Achaeans have already been described as feeling *nemesis* and anger toward Aga-

¹²The evidence suggests that, as is true of his denial of *kholos*, when Paris denies having *nemesis* he is defining the attitude of those who blame him as correct. See, for example, Diomedes' attitude toward Agamemnon's rebuke of him (4.401–18): even though it might contain inaccuracies, it is made in the course of a parainesis and in the interest of leadership, and thus should arouse no *nemesis*. S. Schein, however, sees Paris' acceptance of Hector's rebuke as mocking and ironic (*The Mortal Hero: An Introduction to Homer's Iliad* [Berkeley 1984] 21 f.).

¹³*aideomai*: see note 10 above.

memnon,¹⁴ of which Thersites' speech is presumably an expression. Yet Odysseus' reprimand of Thersites provokes in his companions not *kholos* nor *nemesis*, but only an *akhos* accompanied by, of all things, laughter.¹⁵ That Odysseus' reprimand has dissipated any *kholos* or *nemesis* is further suggested by the fact that, as they grieve, they explicitly endorse Odysseus' authority and the intention of his criticism:

οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν·
 ὣδε δὲ τις εἶπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον·
 “ὦ πόποι, ἦ δὴ μυρὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν
 βουλάς τ' ἐξάρχων ἀγαθὰς πόλεμόν τε κορύσσω·
 νῦν δὲ τόδε μέγ' ἄριστον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν,
 ὃς τὸν λωβητῆρα ἐπεσβόλον ἔσχ' ἀγοράων.
 οὐ θῆν μιν πάλιν αὐτὶς ἀνήσει θυμὸς ἀγῆνωρ
 νεικείειν βασιλῆας ὄνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν.”

2.270-77

Odysseus has done many good things as a leader in council and war (272-73), but the stifling of the loudmouth Thersites was the best (*ariston*, 274-75), because it reinforced the authority of kings (the implication of 276-77). The ethical significance of their *akhos* and their failure to conceive any anger at this attack on their comrade becomes clearer in light of the fact that Odysseus' blame of Thersites only recapitulates his blame of the fleeing *laoi* themselves (200-206).¹⁶ Thus their grief expresses their assent to the authority of the aristocratic heroic ethic.

What Thetis, the Achaean *laos*, Helen and Paris have in common is their ambiguous and subordinate status within their respective communities.¹⁷ In the latter three cases, this is a community dominated by the aristocratic warrior, and their status reflects or is caused by their transgression against an ethical system, or deviance from an ethical norm, constructed around this warrior. In the passages we have examined, characters inspire blame which claims the ethical authority of the

¹⁴On *tói* at 2.222 as Agamemnon, see, e.g., Leaf (London 1886) ad loc.

¹⁵I agree with Leaf that the *laoi* are grieved (270) over the treatment of Thersites in particular, although, I would argue, this is not unconnected to their grief over the blame they have just received from Odysseus speaking on Agamemnon's behalf.

¹⁶Odysseus calls the *laoi* unwarlike (201), superfluous to heroic endeavors (202), and thus justly subordinate to their betters (200-201), to whom have been entrusted traditional rules of conduct (205-206).

¹⁷I am of course not levelling all of these to one character type; rather, I am arguing that their respective ethical qualities include this shared feature, and that their portraits reflect the fact.

heroic code, and is even motivated by the sentiments of *aidōs*, or *nemesis*. The denial of *kholos* or *nemesis* to these objects of blame seems to help to characterize them as ethically deviant, yet also as remorseful, supportive of the ethic which condemns them.

The scene in which Hector imputes to Paris a withdrawal in wrath thus embodies an ethical comparison between Paris and an Achilles or Meleager. Paris' denial of *kholos* opposes him to these figures and assimilates him to the pattern of Helen, the Achaeans *laos*, and Thetis. The subtle contrast in this particular scene between the warrior whose *kholos* justifies and ennoble his withdrawal, and the lesser warrior who must apologetically abjure *kholos* in withdrawal is, we have suggested, generated by the *Iliad*'s ethical hierarchy which has at its top the preeminent warrior with whom it identifies its positive ethical characteristics, such as *kholos*. Thus Achilles' withdrawal because of *akhos* and *kholos* (1.188–92) seems to express that he is a man with a particular capacity for *aidōs* and *nemesis* (e.g., 1.149; 11.649–54). Such a capacity defines him as a man of preeminent heroism: Phoenix' narration of the Meleager story, in which wrath is the centerpiece of heroic action, not only instructs Achilles in heroic etiquette, but is founded on a comparison with these greatest of heroes based on wrath:

πρὶν δ' οὐ τι νημεσσητὸν κεχολῶσθαι.
οὕτω καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἐπευθόμεθα κλέα ἀνδρῶν
ἥρώων, ὅτε κέν τιν' ἐπιζάφελος χόλος ἴκοι'

9.523–25¹⁸

Likewise, Paris' motivation for withdrawing from battle—*akhos* without *kholos*—seems consistent with his characteristic disinclination to *nemesis* (6.351). Just as Achilles' repeated identification with this structure of ethical terms (cf. 23.23, 47) expresses his heroism, so also Paris'

¹⁸Likewise Patroclus, supplicating Achilles to give up his wrath, implies its heroism—however ambivalent its effects—with the adjective *ainaretēs* (16.31). Relevant also is 2.241–42, where Thersites claims that the fact that Agamemnon is still around is proof that Achilles has no *kholos*, but is *methēmōn*, “remiss.” The related *methēmosune* and *methiēmi* are applied to the faint-hearted warrior, such as Paris (6.523), Menelaus (10.121), and others (4.516; 13.229; 20.361, etc.); it is explained as a lack of *aidōs* and *nemesis* (13.108, 121–22). Thersites is clearly wrong about Achilles (e.g., 1.224), but his words corroborate the heroic connotations of Achilles' *kholos*.

D. Claus (note 5 above) 24 argues in detail that Achilles' preeminent heroism—not a rejection of heroism—is expressed through the values he espouses in the Quarrel. Needless to say, to call a characteristic or value heroic is not to assert that it is one-dimensionally positive. The *Iliad* certainly recognizes the ambivalence of some of its cherished values, as, for example, 16.31 suggests (cf. 24.45).

distance from the heroic ethos is conveyed by his different relation to these terms. Yet, as the parallels have suggested, this is an apologetic distance, which does not challenge but rather flatters the *Iliad's* heroism. Moreover, the apologetic aspect to Paris' ethical posture unifies a character some critics have seen as irreconcilably dichotomous: on the one hand, Paris departs from the warrior type, yet his behavior on the battlefield is generally adequate.¹⁹

III

In other terms, Paris' withdrawal from battle shows that he values eros over *nikē* (3.439–46); it is as a figure of eros that Paris apologizes (3.59; 6.333) to the demands and reproaches of a *polemos*-oriented value system and is assigned an ethical attitude of inattention to *nemesis* and *aidos*. This opposition between eros and *polemos*, as well as their respective ethical identities, are larger than the characterization of Paris and run throughout the *Iliad*. This section will briefly sketch out the relation of heroic ethics to this thematic opposition which organizes Paris' characterization and, specifically, the exchange between him and Hector. We thereby hope to show that because the association between ethical vocabulary and ethical type is prominent and familiar in the *Iliad*—which is, after all, about Achilles' withdrawal in *kholos*—such an ethical contrast as we are imputing to this scene could be communicated from what may appear to us to be minute detail.

The *Iliad's* martial imagery borrows from erotic and other non-martial pursuits (e.g., *melpesthai Arēi*, 7.241),²⁰ and the erotic relationship is likewise expressed as a battle fought between weaklings (e.g., 5.348–51). Yet the poem conceives of eros and *polemos* as defining separate and opposing spheres, as is most explicit in the *Iliad's* evaluation of Aphrodite.²¹ Zeus explicitly defines Aphrodite's expertise as the *erga gamoio* and opposes these to the *polemēia erga* which are, he says, the

¹⁹13.765–87, 660–72; 8.81–82; 11.505–507, 581–83; 12.93; 15.341; cf. also 6.521–23. That these scenes are vestiges of an earlier, heroic Paris was, of course, an analyst view; see, e.g., E. Bethe, *Homer: Dichtung und Sage* (Leipzig 1914) 1.248. Of course, Paris generally fights as a bowman: while spearmanship seems to imply strength and courage (1.290; 3.49; 5.197; 7.280–81, 287–89, etc.), faint-hearted warriors are reproached as *iomōroi* (4.242; 14.479).

²⁰See E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley 1979) 101–103; and L. Rissman, *Love as War: Homeric Allusion in The Poetry of Sappho* (Meisenheim 1983) 66–188.

²¹See D. Boedeker, *Aphrodite's Entry into Greek Epic* (Leiden 1974) 43–63.

province of Ares and Athena (5.427–29). Diomedes, facing Aphrodite on the battlefield, implies that Aphrodite, being an *analkis theos*, has dim prospects against him, while she will do well if she is happy to overcome *analkides* women by seduction (5.348–51). This is the way Helen also describes Aphrodite's technique and orientation, when she reproaches her for intervening on Paris' behalf in the duel: Aphrodite, *dolophroneousa*, is out to seduce (*éperopeuein*) Helen, sabotaging Menelaus' right to her by *nikê* (3.399, 404–405).

Paris and Helen are said to be Aphrodite's *philoi* (3.402; 415). Paris, moreover, is endowed with her gifts, which seem to summarize his ethos.²² His *aretai*, as we see from the *neikea* made against him, are all to be identified with her.²³ With no *biê* (11.390; 3.45), he must occupy himself with overcoming women by seduction (*éperopeuta*, 3.39; 13.769). He is, like a woman, *eidos aristos*, *promos* for beauty rather than strength (3.43–45; 3.39; cf. 3.124, etc.). As a lyrist and a dancer (24.261; 3.54; 11.385), he is preferred by Aphrodite to the warrior (3.392–94). His erotic orientation is conceived as a contradiction of his manhood and sanity: he is afflicted with the weak wits of a child or woman (11.389); susceptible to delusion or madness which, in the form of *atê*, made him praise Aphrodite and pursue Helen (6.356; 24.28–30); his valorization of sex over warfare is a kind of madness (3.39). Paradoxically, his unwarlike erotic ethic is the cause of the war (3.46 ff.; 22.114–16) and as such has earned for Paris his value, in the *Iliad's* warrior ethical system, of *lôbbê*, outrage (3.42).²⁴

Throughout the *Iliad* the nexus of themes with which Paris is identified is associated with the erotic or otherwise opposed to the martial. They are, as in Paris, periodically invested by this poem focused on

²²See 3.64–66. The gifts of the gods seem to define the salient features of the receiver. Zeus gave Agamemnon his scepter (9.37–39) but not the *alkê* of a warrior; Pandaros was given his bow by Apollo (2.827); Achilles' ash spear, which only he can wield, was a divine gift to Peleus, along with the immortal wife and horses: all seem to summarize the dilemma of Achilles (24.534–42; 16.140–54; 19.387–417; 17.194–97, 443–47; 18.429–43. Cf. 23.281 and 11.830–32; 13.727, 7.288–89). See 10.243–47; 2.196–97; 14.490–91; 5.59–61; and 23.306–308, where the *philôtes* of a god seems to endow one with some feature of that god.

²³*Neikea* draw, of course, hostile and one-sided portraits. Yet they are not haphazard, but are distortions organized by and reflecting Homeric ethical typology. I argue this point in detail in my forthcoming booklength study on characterization in Homer, with special reference to Achilles' attack on Agamemnon the king.

²⁴7.93–97 illustrates the relationship of *anaideiê* to *lôbbê*; see also, e.g., 1.149, 232. However, Menelaus likens the *lôbbê* of the rape of Helen to the Trojans' *excessive* love for war (13.622–39).

war with an according ethical value of *anaideiē* or indifference to *nemesis*. Priam, grieving for the death of Hector and his other warrior sons (*tous men apôles' Arês*), reproaches those remaining as "things of shame" (*elenkhea*), liars and dancers, *aristoi* at dance-rhythms (*pseus-tai te orkhêstai te, khorotupîëisin aristoi*, 24.260–61). Elsewhere hesitant warriors are instilled with *aidôs* by the taunt that they face "not a dance, but a battle" (15.502, 508; cf. 16.617). The dance appears in a positive light on Achilles' shield, but there it is emblematic of a world at peace and far removed from that of the *Iliad* (18.590–606). On the shield, the dance has sexual associations: it appears in the context of a marriage (18.491–96) and as part of a harvest celebration by young men and women (567).²⁵ Through their epithets *himeroeis* and *poikilos*, dance and the lyre are categorized with the feminine and the erotic.²⁶

Like dance, physical beauty can connote effeminacy and cowardice. Although beauty is an attribute of preeminent warriors (e.g., 21.108), they strive only to be *aristoi* in battle and council; when they fall short at these, their beauty may be tauntingly praised as they are reproached for their lack of *aidôs* (5.787; 8.228; 17.142).

It is the failure to attain manhood, as measured by expertise in the *polemêia erga*, which creates the personality which is most conducive to the ascendance of eros: as it does in the character of Paris, the *Iliad* tends to link together eros, femininity, delusion, and *anaideiē*. Accordingly, while martial encounters proceed by *biē*, erotic encounters do so by trickery: throughout the poem, eros overcomes the deluded.²⁷ Those either unskilled or showing momentary uncertainty in warfare are *nēpioi*—children or women, metaphorically or literally.²⁸ And besides promoting eros, as it does in Paris' case, delusion, *atē*, might cause a warrior to lose his strategic sense (e.g., 8.237); and it plays its most prominent role in Agamemnon's attack on Achilles (1.412, 2; 111, etc.) and other lapses from *aidôs* (8.228, 237; 24.480).

We have argued that Paris' exchange with Hector in Book 6 might be best understood in light of the larger patterns of usage governing the

²⁵See O. Taplin's rich discussion of the Shield, "The Shield of Achilles Within the *Iliad*," *G&R* 28 (1981) 1–21.

²⁶5.429; 3.397; 14.198, 216, 328, 163; 3.139, 446. Cf. Od. 8.246–55, and *Il.* 13.620–39, where dance is also linked with sex and opposed to war.

²⁷14.217. Cf. 14.329; 3.405; 15.31–33; 19.97; 24.28–30.

²⁸2.337–38; 9.440; 11.784; 7.235–41; 2.872–75. E. Vermeule (note 20 above) 157 points out that the loser in a battle is sometimes imagined as female (e.g., 22.124–28). Of course, the battlefield parainesis often combines a call to *aidôs* with an exhortation to "be men" (e.g., 6.112; 8.174; 15.561–62, 661, etc.)

deployment of those ethical terms which are the subject of the brothers' exchange. As is exemplified by Paris' characterization in the *Iliad*, which is built out of themes which the *Iliad* assigns a value in heroic ethical terms, the deployment of ethical terms expresses the *Iliad's* ethical hierarchy by which the warrior is elevated above the lover.²⁹ At 6.325 ff., the ethical vocabulary helps to distinguish Paris from the heroic type represented by an Achilles, and also identifies him with unheroic ethical figures who are marginal to or deviate from the heroic ethical code. Moreover, Paris' denial of a *kholos* not only expresses his nonheroism but also his submission to the ethical authority of the warrior. Thus he cooperatively arms for battle (6.503-19); he even conceives a *kholos* at the death of a *xeinos* (13.660-72). Sporadic attempts at living up to the warrior ideal are certainly in keeping with Paris' ethical value in this poem which celebrates the warrior.³⁰

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²⁹The erotic ethos is not the only nonwarrior ethos the *Iliad* comprehends, of course. For instance, it seems to me that Achilles maligns Agamemnon in relation to his deviation from not only the heroic code (*lóbê*, 1.232; *anaideiê*, 1.149; 9.372), but from the warrior ethos in general. Agamemnon, says Achilles, relies on the authority of the kingship to arrogate *timê* to himself that has been earned by warrior prowess (1.225-30); thus the abusive epithets he hurls at Agamemnon emphasize greed and cowardice, and make specific reference to his kingship (e.g., *démoboros basileus*, 1.231; cf. 1.122, 149, 225). Indeed, in many respects the crime of Agamemnon is made parallel to that of Paris, not the least of which is that both are identified as the cause of suffering for which the warrior's *biê* is required as remedy (6.327-31; 1.240-44). Of course, that the ethical distance between king and warrior is shorter than that between lover and warrior is reflected in the fact that what Achilles wants most is that very *timê* from Zeus which empowers Agamemnon (1.407-12, 506-10, 277-79); while nobody seems to covet the gifts of Aphrodite. Moreover, the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles (which features a *kholos* on both sides) is obviously more central and elaborate than the comparison between the lover and the warrior: see W. Donlan, "The Structure of Authority in the *Iliad*," *Arethusa* 11 (1979), 51-70. See also J. T. Marry, "*Erotos Aretê*: Sappho and the Heroic Ideal," *Arethusa* 12 (1979) 71-92, for a discussion of a contrast between the warrior and eros ethics in Sappho.

³⁰See also in this connection the discussion of 11.369-79 by L. Muellner (*The Meaning of Homeric Eukhomai through its Formulas* [Innsbruck 1976] 90-91), who argues that Paris there misuses an introductory speech formula in a way which reflects his ineptitude as a hero.

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